Backflow Tester Refresher Workshop | 17 April 2023 (IN-PERSON) Refresher workshops are recommended for those who are familiar with backflow prevention and cross-connection control but wish to be refreshed on certain topics in a hands-on environment.The course is comprised of a series of lectures followed by guided exercises in a wet lab area where hands-on experience provides the understanding of the field-testing methods. Tester Training Course | 10-14 April 2023 (IN-PERSON) This course is designed to train the students in the intricacies of field-testing various types of backflow prevention assemblies.Moreover, this research context highlights the particular importance of theory for investigating consequential phenomena that yield scarce data – it is theory which guides data discovery ex ante, helps assess bias ex post, and uncovers key insights that empirical analysis alone cannot generate. This study is the first to generate systematic theory on firms’ CPA concealment strategies. Based on this framework, we generate additional empirically testable propositions on how CPA concealment changes with factors at the country, institution, issue, and firm levels. Finally, we integrate this analysis with positive political theory to place our firm-level calculus in the context of policymaking by identifying the public policymakers whom firms are most likely to influence via CPA concealment. Second, we develop an in-depth analysis of the key benefits and costs of concealing CPA for firms. First, we provide a detailed conceptual background on CPA concealment, including what concealment of CPA is and how it can occur. We develop a theoretical framework consisting of three components to analyze firms’ strategy of CPA concealment. Law-abiding firms often attempt to conceal their corporate political activity (CPA), yet the concealment of CPA has not been matched by our understanding of the phenomenon. Therefore, whether and how firms use their political connections in making location choice is strategic in that it is highly dependent on the economic and political context. Using data on all new subsidiaries established by Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2009, we obtain empirical evidence that corroborates the hypotheses. Moreover, this dampening effect exists (and becomes stronger) when the connected politicians hold political positions that shoulder greater responsibility for resolving local unemployment issues. As a result, firms are less likely to choose a politically connected location that also suffers from higher unemployment. Second, this effect is dampened when local economic conditions may drive local politicians to demand that connected firms engage in economically inefficient but politically desirable tasks, such as hiring superfluous labor. ![]() First, because of various benefits that political connections can generate for firms, all else equal, firms are more likely to choose the locations in which they have connections with local political leaders. We examine how the presence of a firm’s political connections in a candidate location affects the firm’s likelihood of choosing that location over unconnected but otherwise comparable ones to establish a new subsidiary.
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